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THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
v, : 
JOHN CHARLES CLOUD, : Case No. 19884 
D e f e n d an t - Ap p e 11 an t 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, JOHN CHARLES CLOUD, [hereinafter referred 
to as the defendant] appeals from a conviction and judgment imposed 
f • : r M a r d e z 1 i : l 11: i e S e c o n d D e g r e e , a f e 1 o n y o f t h e F :i r s t D e g r e e 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 in the Third Judicial District 
Court i n and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Homer I:; '. 'Wilkinson, J ixdge , presiding on March 8 , 1984. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 23, 1983, Nyla Johnson was found dead In the apartment 
where she and John Cloud resided, at 4370 Highland Drive In Salt 
Lake C11y , U1: a 1 i (' i 2" ' 9) J at ie NI ska 1 a , a f r I en d an d c o - • TO rke r 
of Ms. Johnson, had gone to the residence to pick her up for work 
i' an[> roxima rH 1 v 7:40 i in (T . 2 76 ) , When no one responded to 
knocking on the door, Ms. Niskala entered and noticed blood on 
the hallway floor (T. 279). She looked into a bedroom and saw 
a man in bed sleeping (T. 279). Ms. Niskala turned toward the 
bathroom and discovered the body of Nyla Johnson on the bathroom 
floor (T. 279). After taking a few steps closer to the body, 
Ms. Niskala realized Nyla Johnson was dead (T. 282). Jane then 
departed and went to her place of employment where she called 
Nyla Johnson's ex-husband, McKay Johnson (T. 284). 
Upon receiving the call McKay Johnson went to the apartment 
(T. 320). He entered and saw the defendant, John Cloud, standing 
in the hall getting dressed (T. 320). Mr. Johnson asked John 
Cloud what was happening and the defendant gave no reply (T. 321). 
Mr. Johnson then proceeded down the hallway and discovered the 
body of the victim and called an ambulance (T. 321-322) . While 
waiting for the ambulance the defendant told Mr. Johnson that 
as he approached the front door, early that morning, a black man 
exited the apartment wielding a large knife (T. 323). He further 
stated that a struggle ensued during which his hands were cut 
by the knife (T. 323). 
When the police arrived they Questioned Mr. Cloud and he 
repeatedly related essentially the same story of a black attacker 
(T. 358). The defendant told the police he had left the residence 
the night before, Sunday, May 22nd and went to a nearby store 
to buy beer and a loaf of bread (T. 382). He then drove to Liberty 
Park to feed the ducks and later returned to the apartment parking 
lot (T. 382). He stated that he fell asleep in the pick-up 
truck not ax^akening until the early morning of May 23rd (T. 382). 
When he approached the apartment he was attacked by the black 
he entered the residence and discovered the body of the victim 
and called the police i'l , jM.J id "i i 'I he poi ice questioned neighbors • 
i n an attempt to determine if anyone had seen a black man matching 
t h e d e s c r i p 1:1 < :) i i g i T e i 1 1: ;; J \ : • 1: IT i C 1 o i i 1 
The State introduced evidence inconsistent with Mr. Cloud's 
story. The testimony of the medical examiner pi aced the time 
of death around 1 i 30 a ,m. on May 23rd (T 525) i • 1 :n ltche" r 1 : 
with traces of blood was found inside the residence and analyzed 
f M r I J J <" 111 t y i>' s , T e s t j m o n• ? b j I lar t ha K e i r I i i d 1 c a t e d t ha. t two 
types of blood found on the knife were consistent with, blood samples 
taken from the defendant and Nyl a Johnson (T 446-470), Similarly, 
numer ou s b 1 o o d s t a ine d e xh ib i t s f oun d ii i 11: ie ap ar trriei 11: we r e de t: e rm in e d 
to be covered with blood types consistent with the samples taken 
f r oni Mr , C1 • :> i I < I < ii i • I 1 1 i < = 1:;: ? I c t: i m ( T . • 4 6 5 - 4 7 \) Pho t o g r aph s t ak en 
by the police of the defendant's ankles, feet and toes showed 
traces of dried blood although no traces of blood were found inside 
the shoes he had been we ar ii Ig (I" 3 8 8 - 3 9 ( )') . 
At trial the defendant admitted to stabbing and killing 
the '"\ Ti c t i m a n< I s i ibseqi Ient: 1 y m« a.ki ng up the story of the black assailant 
(T. 600, 6 0 4 ) , He maintained throughout his testimony that he 
caused the death of the victim under circumstances where he was 
u n d e i: e x t: r e in e n I e x 1 1 a 1 : • i e in o t i o n a 1 d I s t r e s s . 
John Cloud testified he had a serious alcohol problem., for 
the past thirty years (T, 577). As a result of his alcoholism 
he lost his family i i i 1 97 5 and subsequently his employment (I, 
576) John grieved over the divorce and the loss of his wife 
a n d c '1: i i 1 d. r e n f o r t h e n e x t s e v e r a 1 y e a r s a n d 1 I i s a ] c o h o ] i c 
condition worsened (T. 579-82). During this period he sought 
help for his alcohol problem by drifting from one rehabilitation 
program to the next (T. 583). Although he was enrolled in numerous 
programs he was never able to complete any program and he continued 
to suffer from accute alcohol abuse. He arrived in Utah in early 
1983 and enrolled in the Veteran's Administration Hospital Alcohol 
and Drug Program (T. 590-591). 
The defendant met Nyla Johnson at the Sojourner Club in 
early March 1983 (T. 585). Shortly thereafter, he moved into 
her apartment and their relationship continued to develop (T. 
588). In April, 1983 they decided to marry and notified several 
friends of their intentions (T. 589). 
Mr. Cloud was deeply concerned about his and Nyla's alcohol 
abuse problems and the impact that would have upon their relationship 
(T. 597). He decided to again seek help and on May 1, 1983 enrolled 
in the Odyssey House Program in Salt Lake City. Feeling that 
it was necessary to avoid contact with Nyla during this period, 
he informed her, without explanation, that he was leaving for 
Denver, Colorado (T. 598). While at Odyssey House he dedicated 
himself to the program and dealing with his problem. During this 
time he continuously thought of Nyla and the changes he must make 
to prepare for their upcoming marriage (T. 600). However, on 
May 21 without completing the program, John decided to check out 
and return to Nyla (T. 602). Mr. Cloud called Nyla and explained 
that he had been in a treatment program and asked if she could 
pick him up about 5:30 p.m. (T. 602). 
John was excited about being reunited with Nyla but his 
enthusiasm was soon dampened at her apparent interest in another 
person. On the way home Nyla took an unexplained detour and drove 
to an unknown address in a neighborhood unfamiliar to the defendant 
(T. 603). He asked Nyla what was occurring and she told him not 
to ask (T. 604). She only explained that she was engaged in "detective 
work,f and after a few minutes continued on to her apartment (T. 
604). The next morning his suspicions were again aroused when 
Nyla said she was going to leave for a few minutes and was gone 
for about an hour. He began to believe that Nyla was seeing another 
man when she returned and refused to discuss where she had been 
(T. 608). Later that afternoon Mr. Cloud became increasingly 
concerned when Nyla again left for an hour and subseauently returned 
without explanation (T. 609). The defendant testified that he 
began drinking heavily that afternoon and became increasingly 
frustrated by her continuing absence and her refusal to share 
with him what she was doing (T. 609). Later in the afternoon 
Nyla informed John that she had a date that evening but that it 
meant nothing to her though she felt obligated to go (T. 611). 
He became very upset and wanted to know what was happening to 
their commitment to be married. Nyla remained unresponsive to 
his concerns (T. 611-612). 
The defendant left the apartment and went to the store 
and purchased some beer and bread (T. 612). He called his friend 
Bob Stone to seek advice about what to do with his relationship 
with Nyla (T. 612-613). He asked to meet with Bob Stone but he 
refused because John had been drinking (T. 613). The defendant 
drove to Liberty Park and fed the ducks and thought about what 
he should do (T. 613). After he returned to the apartment complex 
John waited in the truck because he was afraid he would find Nyla 
with another man (T. 613). 
A short time later he went into the apartment and saw Nyla 
on the end of the sofa going through her purse (T. 614). He told 
her that they needed to talk about what was going on in their 
lives (T. 614). He was upset and angry (T. 615). He asserted 
that they could not start a marriage under such circumstances 
(T. 615) . John testified that he started drinking large amounts 
of liquor very quickly (T. 615). He demanded to know who Nyla 
was seeing and why she refused to discuss the matter (T. 615). 
She went into the bathroom and he went into the kitchen and had 
another stiff drink (T. 615). The defendant then demanded Nyla 
come to him in the front room and discuss the situation (T. 616). 
She then told John that she did not want to have anyching to do 
with him (T. 616) . She said she was tired, wanted to forget the 
marriage, and did not want to have anything to do with anybody 
(T. 616). At that point John testified that he went crazy (T. 
616-617). His ears started ringing, and his "head just started 
exploding" (T. 617). He then got a knife, went into the bathroom 
where she was standing and started swinging the knife and stabbing 
her (T. 617). 
Although John Cloud's memory was not complete, he did recall 
sometime later seeing the victim laying on the floor (T. 617). 
His hands were bleeding and he tried to wash them off (T. 617). 
John went into the kitchen and drank a beer because his mouth 
was dry (T. 618). He felt sick and dizzy so he went to bed (T. 
618). Sometime later in the morning he again got up and found 
she was dead and what he had done. He then became frightened 
and concocted the story of the black assailant which he later 
related to to Mr. Johnson and the police (T. 620). 
Witnesses at trial verified the defendant's testimony concerning 
the detective work of Nyla Johnson and John's concern over what 
he felt was happening to their relationship. Mr. Ed Barton, an 
investigator for Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, testified 
because of the unavailability of Ross Record (T. 568-578). Mr. 
Barton stated that Ross had told him that he was dating Nyla during 
the time Mr. Cloud was in the Odyssey program (T. 575). Mr. Barton 
further testified that Ross Record stated he had asked Nyla to 
do some detective work concerning Ross' ex-wife on the weekend 
Nyla died (T. 576). This was also confirmed by a co-worker of 
Nyla, Bonnie Wilson, who testified that Nyla had asked her if 
she had a camera and infra-red film. Bonnie further testified 
that Nyla wanted her to attempt to do some detective work that 
weekend (T. 556-557). 
Witnesses also testified regarding John's emotional state 
just prior to Nyla's death. Mark Crockett testified that on the 
evening of Sunday, May 22nd, he overheard an angry male voice 
from inside John and Nyla's apartment at around 7:30 p.m. although 
he could not identify the voice, he stated it was clearly audible 
in the hallway area (T. 374-375). Bob Stone testified that John 
had called him the evening of May 22nd, and that he was very upset 
about his relationship with Nyla (T. 565). Mr. Stone stated that 
he refused to meet with the defendant because he could tell that 
he was upset and had been drinking (T. 565). 
Dr. Louis G. Moench also testified regarding the defendant's 
mental condition on May 22-23, 1983. He said that Mr. Cloud had 
a low frustration tolerance and he would react to a problem rather 
than contemplate his options (T. 703). He felt that John Cloud 
had a problem with alcohol since 16 and had a family history of 
alcoholism (T. 703). Dr. Moench further testified that drinking 
had made Mr. Cloud paranoid and suspicious of others (T. 704). 
As a result of the circumstances as viewed by the defendant and 
alcoholic induced suspicion Dr. Moench stated that in his opinion 
at the time that the defendant caused the death of Nyla Johnson, 
he was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance or distress 
(T. 713). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The defendant submits that the court erred in admitting 
color photographs of Nyla Johnson. The probative value of the 
photographs was substantially outweighed by the prejudicial affect 
upon the jury. 
The defendant's requested jury instructions on manslaughter 
should have been submitted to the jury. The denial of those instructions 
had the affect of directing a verdict of second degree murder 
which effectively prevented the jury from considering the lesser 
included offense of manslaughter. 
There was insufficient evidence to sustain the verdict 
of second degree murder. Viewing the evidence most favorable 
to the State, the verdict cannot be sustained. 
The cumulative affect of the errors committed by the court deprive 
the defendant of a fair trial and constitutes reversible error. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
INTRODUCTION OF PHOTOGRAPHS OF DEAD VICTIM CONSTITUTED 
UNFAIR PREJUDICE AND IS A REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
Evidence may be excluded at trial if, in the discretion 
of the trial court, its probative value is substantially outweighed 
by the danger that it would prejudice the jury against the defendant. 
Utah R. Ev. 403 states that: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. Utah Code Ann. Vol. 9B (Supp. 
1984). 
Here the defendant contends that the admission of five 
photographs of the victim at trial over the objection of counsel 
constitutes reversible error. 
The process of evaluating the probity and prejudice inherent 
in a particular piece of evidence can be a complex one calling 
for a sifting of many disparate factors. Among the central consideration: 
in determining probative value are, first, "how strong a tendency" 
the proffered evidence has to prove an issue of consequence in 
the litigation and second the proponents need for the evidence. 
United States v. Grassi, 602 F.2d 1192, 1195 (Fifth Circuit 1979). 
Rule 403 also requires a trial court to determine the amount 
of unfair prejudice resulting from the introduction of a piece 
of evidence. The phrase "unfair prejudice" does not refer alone 
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to the fact that a particular piece of evidence will have adverse 
effects on a party's case. Most evidence offered by an opponent 
should have this effect. Rather, "unfair prejudice" within this 
context means an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper 
basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one. Notes 
of the advisory Committee on Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 
28 U.S.C.A. Rule 403 at 102. Relevancy is thus not the sole 
test of admissibility of evidence: admissibility depends, rather, 
on a balancing of the various effects of the admission of such 
evidence, considered in light of recognized rules of law governing 
the administration of criminal law. State v. Beers, 448 P.2d 
104, 109 (Ariz. 1968). Thus, the correct rule is that exhibits 
which may tend to inflame the jury must first be found relevant. 
The trial court must then consider the probative value of the 
exhibits and determine whether it outweighs the danger of prejudice. 
In State v. Chappie, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz, 1983) the Court 
held the trial court erred by admitting pictures of the deceased 
victim because the photographs did not have probative value as 
to whether the defendant was in fact the perpetrator. The fact 
that the victim was Rilled, the medical cause of his death, and 
what was done with his body after death were not in controversy. 
Due to the lack of need for the pictures the Court held: 
The matters illustrated by the photographs were 
cumulative of uncontradicted and undisputed testimony, 
as well as the subiect of a stipulation offered by 
the defendant. We find, therefore, that the photographs 
in question had little probative value on the issues 
being tried and that their admission in evidence could 
have almost no value or result except to inflame the 
minds of the jury. Under such circumstances, there 
was nothing for the trial court to weigh, nothing 
on which its discretion could be exercised, and the 
admission of the photographs was error. 
_Id. at 1X16. 
In United States v. Dolliole, 597 F.2d 102 (7th Cir. 1979) 
cert, denied 99 S.Ct. 2894, the Court stressed the need, when 
considering the probative value of evidence, to assess the prosecutor's 
need for the evidence. Here the Court of Appeals considered the 
value of prior crime evidence, commenting: 
When the government has ample evidence to establish 
an element of the crime, the probative value of the 
prior crime evidence is greatly reduced, and the risk 
of prejudice which accompanies the admission of such 
evidence will not be "justified. 
The effect of stipulation on the Rule 403 balancing process 
was examined in United States v. Spletzer, 602 ^.2d 1192 (5th 
Cir. 1979). At his trial, Spletzer, who was charged with escape 
from a federal prison, offered to admit that at the time of his 
escape he had been confined in a federal prison pursuant to a 
judgment of conviction. Despite this tender, the district court 
permitted the government to introduce a certified copy of Spletzerfs 
prior bank robbery conviction. The Court held that the proposed 
stipulation eliminated the prosecutorial need for the copy of 
the judgment and that the district court abused its discretion 
in admitting the copy. 
In Oxendine v. State, 335 p.2d 940 (Okla. Crim. 1958), the 
defendant argued that several pictures of the deceased victim 
were of no probative value since there was no controversy as to 
cause of death. Oxendine admitted the shooting and his testimonv 
was not in conflict with that of the state witnesses. As in the 
present case, the defendant testified under oath and admitted 
all the details of the murder. In reversing the lower decision 
due to admission of the damaging photogranhs, the court stated: 
In the case at bar there was no reason for the introduction 
of the colored photo slides. There was no issue nor 
controversy as to the cause of death. The defendants 
admitted the crime in intricate detail. The photos 
could not possibly lend assistance in the determination 
of defendant's guilt. It was admitted. Had there 
been a conflict as to the shooting or cause ot death 
or location of uhe wounds, or an issue to which the 
photos were relevant, then and in that event, they 
would have been admissible had they been taken prior 
to the performance of the autopsy-
Id. at 943. 
Utah courts have applied the Rule 403 balancing test in 
numerous instances. The earLy case of State v. Poe, 441 P.^d 
512 (Utah 1968) saw this court reverse the defendant's rirst degree 
murder conviction due ro tne unfair prejudice resulting from the 
trial court's admission of certain photos of the victim. The 
pictures were taken during the course of an autopsy and later 
displayed to the jury. As in the present case, the identity of 
the victim, his death, and its cause had already been established. 
The Court found the inflamatory nature of the photographs outweighed 
their probative value, concluding. 
In the instant case they have no probative value. 
All the material facts which could conceivably have 
been adduced from a viewing of the slides had been 
established by uncontradicted-lay and medical testimony. 
The only purpose served was to inflame and arouse 
the jury. 
_Id. at 515. 
In State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (Utah 1979) the court weighed 
the impact of acceptance into evidence photographs of the murder 
victim's bullet wound when there was no dispute as to the shooting 
or cause of death. Even though the conviction was affirmed the 
court stated: 
Because the defendant did not dispute shooting 
Dirks, and because the medical examiner testified 
that the victim died as a result of the gunshot, the 
admission of the photographs was superfluous. We 
do not condone the admission of the photographs in 
this case, since we are able to find no evidentiary-
value for the photographs other than the hoped for 
emotional impact on the jury. 
Xd. at 813. 
In applying the Rule 403 balancing test to the facts of 
the present case it becomes readily apparent that the photographs 
should not have been admitted into evidence at trial. There was 
no probative value to the photographs since the defendant admitted 
killing the victim and the graphic nature of the pictures was 
clearly prejudicial. 
The defendant initially argues the photographs should have 
been excluded because they were not probative of any issue at 
trial. Counsel for the defendant, made it abundantly clear even 
before trial, that it would not contest any issue as to the cause 
and manner of Nyla Johnson's death. Prior to trial, the defendant 
submitted a motion in limine to suppress the introduction of the 
photographs into evidence (T. 2-23). The trial court was also 
given a detailed memorandum, timely filed, outlining the defendant's 
position. 
Counsel for the defendant claimed during opening statements 
that there would be no issue as to the death of the victim, the 
cause of her death, that the defendant alone was responsible for 
her death, and the time when the death occurred (T. 35-40). Counsel 
also indicated that there would be no disagreement as to the number 
of wounds inflicted on the victim, the location of the wounds 
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and all other facts surrounding her death (T. 40). In fact, counsel 
argued throughout the trial that there was no issue in which the 
defendant did not concur with the state. 
In addition, the defendant testified, under oath, that 
he was responsible for the victimTs death (T. 384). He described 
in detail the circumstances leading up to the murder and his involvement 
in that murder. The defendant's testimony was in almost complete 
agreement with the testimony of witnesses for the state. In Oxendine 
v. State, Supra, the Court, under similar circumstances held testimony 
of the defendant sufficient to eliminate any need for photographs 
in establishing elements of the charge. 
The state also had the benefit of testimony from numerous 
medical and lay witnesses. Jeff Stami of the County Sheriff's 
Office gave a detailed description of the scene of the crime and 
presented a diagram of the apartment (T. 46-49). Jane Niskala 
and McKay Johnson, friends of the victim testified about the scene, 
the location and position of the body and about the presence and 
demeanor of the defendant (T. 49-67, 92-99). Further details 
of the condition of the deceased and the surrounding area were 
provided by paramedics (T. 107-127). Medical experts testified 
as to the cause of death, including detailed descriptions of the 
body and wounds (T. 179-218). 
Virtually none of this testimony was contested by the defendant. 
Each element of the crime was or could have been established through 
the use of testimony and evidence other than the objectional photographs. 
Such a situation forces the state to assume a greater responsibility 
in establishing the need for the photographs. United States v. 
Dolliole, Supra. Under similar circumstances, this court held 
the admission of photographs to be an error in State v. Wells, 
Supra. 
In addition to the lack of probative value, the defendant 
claims the photographs unduly prejudiced the jury to convict. 
Two of the photographs that were submitted were enlarged, showing 
in vivid color the details of the gory scene (State's Exhibit 
6, 15) (T. 314). In each of the photographs the jury saw large 
amounts of the victim's dried blood which had covered her face, 
clothes and the surrounding carpet. One picture of the deceased 
(State's Exhibit 6) showed her finger extended in a defiant position 
sometimes described as "giving you the finger". 
The state also admitted several autopsy photographs (State's 
Exhibit 40, 41, 42) showing various injuries to the deceased's 
body (T. 314). The photographs were in color and clearly held 
great emotional impact. 
The defendant argues that the photographs were of such 
a nature that their introduction into evidence constitutes reversible 
error. Although the admission of photographs is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, there are numerous cases which 
state that an appellate court can and will reverse a trial court 
when photographs are so inflamatory as to outweigh probative value 
State v. Beers, Supra; Oxendine v. State, Supra, and State v. 
Poe, Supra. In assessing whether the admission of the photographs 
into evidence was reversible, the crucial question is not whether 
there is substantial evidence to support the judgment, but whether 
the error affected the judgment. United States v. Robinson, 544 
F.2d 611 (2nd Cir. 1976) . 
In State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338, (Utah 1977), the Utah 
Court stressed that a court may reverse a confiction if the error 
is such that 
"there exists a reasonable probability or likelihood 
that there would have been a result more favorable 
to the defendant in absence of the error. 
Id. at 1352. 
In this case, the photographs were clearly inflamatory 
in nature. Their vivid display of blood and gore would clearly 
affect the emotions of even the coldest juror. In State v. Garcia, 
663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983) the Utah Supreme Court warned that 
"the more inflamatory the photographs, the grater 
the need to establish its essential evidentiary value." 
I_d. at 64. 
Yet, the record clearly demonstrates that the state had 
no need for the photographs is establishing its case. Each element 
was established and agreed to at trial, even by the defendant 
himself. The use of the photographs at trial was clearly prejudicial 
and cumulative of other testimony and exhibits. Their introduction 
into evidence clearly constitutes reversible error. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT MR. CLOUD'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS. 
At the close of the trial, defense counsel requested three 
instructions which supported the defendant's theory of the case. 
Defendants requested instruction on manslaughter as a lesser included 
offense was granted and is not at issue here. (Defendant's requested 
Instruction No. 20, Appendix A ). The defendant did not dispute 
1- In Garcia, the Court affirmed a defendant's second degree 
murder conviction. Unlike the case at "hand, certain legal issues 
"°^p n^ni-ested. making the photographs were relevant. 
the existance of the elements of second degree murder, nor the 
second degree murder instruction that was given. However, defendant 
requested a transitional instruction which asked the jury to go 
beyond the elements of second degree murder and consider defendant's 
diminished responsibility, (Defendant's requested Instruction 
No. 21, Appendix B ). According to this instruction, a homicide 
which is otherwise second degree murder becomes manslaughter if 
the defendant's responsibility is diminished. The trial court 
refused to grant this instruction. The defendant through counsel 
properly preserved objection to the court's denial of this instruction 
(T. 558). 
The court properly instructed the jury of the elements 
of Second Degree Murder in Instruction No. 18 (See Appendix C ). 
The next to last sentence of that instruction, however, without 
the proper clarifying instructions requested by the defense, precludes 
the jury from considering the lesser included offense of manslaughter. 
That sentence is as follows: 
"If the State has proved each and every one of the 
foregoing elements to your satisfaction and beyond 
a reasonable doubt then it is your duty to find John 
Charles Cloud guilty of the offense of Criminal Homicide, 
Murder in the Second Degree, as charged in the Information." 
Utah's manslaughter statute reflects the theory of diminished 
responsibility. Specific consideration of the "extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation 
or excuse" of the accused at the time of the homicide embodies 
the theory of allowing consideration of evidence relevant to intent. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-205 (1953 as amended). The purpose of such 
evidence is to establish, by negating the requisite intent for 
a second degree murder, that in fact a lesser degree of offense 
was committed. 
In People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 
386 P.2d 677 (1963) the court held that where the defense had 
introduced substantial evidence of diminished responsibility, 
the court must instruct as to the legal significance of the evidence. 
Justice Traynor found the explanatory instruction was "necessary 
for the jury to be fully and fairly charged upon the relevant 
law." I_d. at 682. Although the question in State v. Henderson, 
arose in the context of the trial court's failure to grant an 
instruction on the defense of diminished responsibility, the rationale 
applies here as well. In State v. Cripps, Utah No. 19140 filed 
October 26, 1984, this Court reversed a conviction of distribution 
of a controlled substance because of a misleading jury instruction 
in entrapment. This court noted the risk that the instruction 
"obscured the proper legal standard. In the jurors' minds . . . " 
Id. at 5. 
Without the requested instruction, the jury would necessarily 
halt their deliberations at the second degree murder level because 
they found a knowing and intentional killing. That fact was never 
in dispute. However, they should have been additionally reauired 
to view the knowing and intentional killing in light of evidence 
of Mr. Cloud's extreme emotional disturbance. If the jurors had 
been instructed to apply evidence of Mr. Cloud's diminished responsibility 
to what was an otherwise knowing and intentional homicide, their 
deliberations would have properly progressed to consideration 
of manslaughter. Although the manslaugther instruction allowed, 
for some consideration of Mr. Cloud's diminished responsibility 
its application was necessarily limited without the transitional 
instruction. As the instructions were given, the jurors had no 
reason to even consider manslaughter. The jury was never fully 
and fairly charged as to the relevant law as required by the court 
in People v. Henderson, 386 P.2d at 683. As found by the California 
Supreme Court in People v. Henderson, the jury must be instructed 
on the significance of diminished capacity so they may properly 
consider the actor's intent in determining the degree of his responsibili 
The requested instruction might have prevented the jury from convicting 
defendant of second degree murder. Failure to grant defendant's 
requested Instruction No. 21 constituted reversible error. 
The second instruction, the denial of which Mr. Cloud now 
appeals, required the jury to convict on the lower degree of homicide 
if reasonable doubt existed as to which degree of homicide the 
defendant should be guilty of. (Defendant's requested Instruction 
No. 24, Appendix D ). Defense counsel properly preserved 
objection to the court's denial of these instructions (T. 558). 
The second disputed instruction would have required the 
jury to convict on the lower degree of homicide if doubt existed 
as to which degree of homicide the defendant should be convicted 
of. 
The language of the instruction is akin to the statutory 
language of Utah Code Ann. 577-17-1 (1953 as amended); 
"Doubt as to degree -- Convicted only on lowest. When 
it appears the defendant has committed a public offense 
and there is reasonable doubt as to which of two or 
more degrees he is guilty, he shall be convicted only 
of the lower degree." 
In State v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88 (Utah 1981) this Court announced 
if an instruction is supported by evidence and its meaning is 
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clear, the jury may be instructed in the form of statutory language. 
The meaning of the statute is clear. The court settled the question 
of evidentiary support by granting the manslaughter instruction. 
Failure to grant this reauested instruction violated the defendant's 
right to have the jury properly instructed as to the relevant 
law in this case. 
Failure to require the jury to convict on the lower offense 
if they had reasonable doubt as to which degree of the offense 
Mr.' Cloud was guilty of amounted to depriving Mr. Cloud of his 
defense. This, coupled with failure of the court to explain the 
effects of diminished capacity as applied to an otherwise second 
degree homicide denied defendant his right to a fair trial. The 
verdict must therefore be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT A VERDICT OF SECOND DEGREE HOMICIDE. 
The standard for reversing a jury conviction is well established 
If the evidence in a case is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable so that reasonable minds must entertain a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime the conviction must 
be reversed. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983); State 
v. Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980). 
-20-
The evidence must be veiwed in a light most favorable to 
the jury verdict. State v. Kerekes, 1161, 1168. Even stretching 
the evidence to its logical limit, however, the court may not 
take a speculative leap to bridge the gap between the evidence 
needed to convict and the evidence actually presented at trial. 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 445. 
The only contested issue at trial was John Cloud's state 
of mind at the time of the homicide. All of the testimony given 
at trial is consistent with the defense that John Cloud was under 
extreme mental or emotional distress for which there was a reasonable 
excuse. The prosecution witnesses verified that the couple had 
been having an extended argument and that John Cloud was upset. 
Bob Stone testified that John Cloud was very upset and drunk hours 
before the homicide and Mr. Barton's and Bonnie Wilson's testimony 
explains Mr. Cloud's misperception about Nyla's actions. Most 
importantly, the uncontested expert opinion of Dr. Louis Moench 
established that John Cloud was under extreme emotional distress 
at the time of the homicide. Dr. Moench testified Mr. Cloud was 
paranoid due to alcoholism and had a reactive personality. Under 
those conditions he felt there was a reasonable explanation for 
John Cloud's actions. 
In this case there is no evidence to support a jury verdict 
of second degree homicide. The defendant submits that viewing 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the State reasonable 
minds must entertain a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt 
of second degree murder. The judgment must therefore be reversed. 
POINT IV 
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF MISTAKES AT TRIAL CONSTITUTE 
REVERSIBLE ERROR. 
The defendant has raised several issues concerning his 
conviction in the court below. Each inadmissible photograph and 
improper jury instruction and the insufficiency of the evidence 
created reversible error in this case. Although we cannot know 
what evidence the jury considered in reading its verdict, the 
amount of inappropriate evidence that was admitted in this case 
cannot be ignored. 
The cumulative effect, if not the individual errors, warrants 
a new trial. In Gooden v. State, 617 P.2d 248, 250 (Okl. Crim. 
App. 1980), the State Court stated: 
When a review of the entire record reveals numerous 
irregularities that tend to prejudice the rights of 
a defendant and where an accumulation of errors denies 
a defendant a fair trial, the case will be reversed, 
even though one of the errors, standing alone, would 
not be ample to justify reversal. 
The prejudicial effect of the errors in this cannot be 
quantified. Nevertheless, no juror could have ignored all of 
the inadmissible evidence and improper court instructions. The 
judgment must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
John Cloud requests this Court reverse his conviction, 
or, in the alternative grant him a new trial. The introduction 
of the gruesome photographs created an undue risk of substantial 
prejudice against Mr. Cloud. The refusal of the trial court to 
submit the two ]ury instructions requested by defense counsel 
effectively denied consideration of Mr. Cloud's defense by the 
jury. The evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain the verdict 
of second degree murder. Therefore, John Cloud, by and through 
his attorney, respectfully requests that the conviction be reversed 
or a new trial grantecL 
py 
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APPENDIX A 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ ° 
A person commits manslaughter, a Second Degree Felony, 
if he; 
(a) Recklessly causes the death of another; or 
(b) Causes the death of another under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse. 
'i*j 
APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTION NO. I I 
When a homicide which would otherwise be murder in the 
second degree is committed under the influence of extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation, 
then the offense constitutes manslaughter. 
'fv^ 
APPENDIX C 
INSTRUCTION NO. / £ 
Before you may find the defendant, JOHN CHARLES CLOUD, 
guilty of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second 
Degree, the State must prove each and every one of the following 
elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt: 
1. That on or about May 23, 1983, John Charles Cloud 
unlawfully caused the death of Nyla Johnson; and 
2. That John Charles Cloud committed such act either; 
(a) intentionally or knowingly; or 
(b) intending; to cause serious bodily iniury to another, 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life; and 
3. That such acts took place in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah. 
If the State has proved each and every one of the foregoing 
elements to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt then 
it is your duty to find John Charles Cloud guilty of the offense 
of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, as charged 
in the Information. However, if the State has failed to prove 
any one or more of such elements beyond a reasonable doubt then 
you cannot find John Charles Cloud guilty of the offense of Criminal 
Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, and should then consider 
the lesser included offense of Manslaughter. 
APPENDIX D 
INSTRUCTION NO. i-1 
If you find that the defendant in this case has committed 
a criminal homicide but you have a reasonable doubt as to which 
of two or more degrees of that crime he is guilty, you must convict 
him of the lowest degree only. 
The crime of criminal homicide - murder in the second 
degree - charged in the Information in this case, necessarily 
includes the lesser offense of criminal homicide - manslaughter. 
